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Abstract: A secure and private framework for inter-agent communication and coordination is
developed. This allows an agent, in our case a fleet owner, to ask questions or submit queries in
an encrypted fashion using semi-homomorphic encryption. The submitted query can be about
the interest of the other fleet owners for using a road at a specific time of the day, for instance, for
the purpose of collaborative vehicle platooning. The other agents can then provide appropriate
responses without knowing the content of the questions or the queries. Strong privacy and
security guarantees are provided for the agent who is submitting the queries. It is also shown
that the amount of the information that this agent can extract from the other agent is bounded.
In fact, with submitting one query, a sophisticated agent can at most extract the answer to
two queries. This secure communication platform is used subsequently to develop a distributed
coordination mechanisms among fleet owners.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The advances in communication technology has created
new opportunities regarding shared economy. An example
is collaborative driving, such as heavy-duty vehicle pla-
tooning or ride sharing, with the aim of reducing costs or
carbon footprint of commuters or fleets (Besselink et al.,
2016). This has motivated studies for creating appropriate
incentives for the fleet owners to collaborate (Farokhi
et al., 2015). Although promising, heavy-duty vehicle pla-
tooning has not yet been adopted by the larger population
of vehicles. Beside technological and legal barriers, this
could be partly motivated by that commercial, often com-
peting, entities are unwilling to share their entire private
data, e.g., the routes of their vehicles and their travel
times, with each other even if doing so results in lower op-
erative costs. This could be because of privacy constraints
by the customers or secretive nature of marketing agencies.
Therefore, it is of interest to create private and secure
match-making services for effective coordination among
competing entities to facilitate these new technologies. It
goes without saying that the use for such services is not
limited to vehicle platooning and can be justified in many
other setups, such as ride sharing, collaborative logistics,
energy markets, and even online dating services.
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Following this motivation, in this paper, we create a secure
and private framework for communication between two
agents, fleet owners within the context of the heavy-duty
vehicle platooning. In the presented framework, it is possi-
ble for an agent to ask a question or submit a simple query
regarding the interest of the other agents about using a
road at a specific time of the day (for forming platoons) in
an encrypted fashion. This is done in such a way that the
other agents can provide their responses without knowing
the content of the questions or the queries. The framework
is developed with the aid of semi-homomorphic encryption,
which allows algebraic manipulation of the plain data
without the need for decryption using appropriate compu-
tations over the encrypted data; see, e.g., (Yi et al., 2014a)
about homomorphic encryption. This category of encryp-
tion techniques makes it possible for the second agent
(i.e., the fleet owner receiving the encrypted question)
to respond to it using appropriate manipulations of the
encrypted data. Strong privacy and security guarantees
are provided for the agent who submits the query. It is
also shown that the amount of the information that the
questioning agent can extract from all the other agents
is bounded (in fact with one question a fleet owner can
at most extract the answer to two questions about the
interests of the other fleet owners, which could be negli-
gible in comparison to the number of possible questions).
This secure communication platform is used subsequently
to develop distributed coordination mechanisms for heavy-
duty vehicle platooning. Note that although the platform
is developed in the context of match-making for heavy-
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duty vehicle platooning, the outcomes are more general
and can be readily used in other examples as well (specifi-
cally if the questions or the queries are regarding selecting
an element of a finite discrete set).
This paper is in essence close to the problem of private
searching on streaming data (Ostrovsky and Skeith, 2007;
Yi and Bertino, 2011; Yi et al., 2014b; Boneh and Waters,
2007), where it is of interest to determine if certain
important keywords are used within private encrypted
messages, such as text messages and e-mails, while the
content of the messages itself is not of special interest
(at least not if the keywords are not utilized). However,
it should be noted that the privacy guarantees of those
studies are one sided (with the aim of protecting the
privacy of the messages). However, in this paper, we would
like to provided guarantees to both sides, i.e., both the
agents posing the question and the ones responding to it.
Recently, homomorphic encryption have been utilized to
solve security and privacy issues in networked control and
estimation (Farokhi et al., 2016; Kogiso and Fujita, 2015).
Those studies are however involved with the intricacies
of dynamical systems and using encryption for closing the
control loop rather than creating a private/secure commu-
nication framework among multiple (possibly competing)
agents. Further, they do not provide two-sided privacy
guarantees (as it is not of special interest to preserve the
privacy of a malicious agent if it communicates with the
controller).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First,
the problem formulation and some necessary background
material are presented in Section 2. A secure and private
communication framework between two agents is provided
in Section 3. Section 4 uses the framework to construct
a distributed mechanism for coordination among several
fleet owners. Finally, numerical examples are presented in
Section 5 and the paper is concluded in Section 6.
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, the problem formulation and the results are
provided within the context of coordination among fleet
owners for heavy-duty vehicle platooning. However, the
results can be readily used in other classes of problems in-
volving match-making and coordination, such as ride shar-
ing and electricity markets. Investigating the platooning
coordination problem allows us to pose concrete questions
and provide meaningful privacy and security guarantees.
Consider the case with F fleet owners, each owning Ii,
i ∈ F := {1, . . . , F}, heavy-duty vehicles. These vehicles
can operate over various roads on a transportation network
in set P (based on the requests of the customers of the fleet
owners) and at various time intervals of the day (based on
logistical constraints and customer preferences) in set T
such that |T | < ∞. Here, we discretize the time of the
day (e.g., half an hour windows of the day) so that the
number of time windows of interest is finite. We use the
set of integers W := {1, . . . , |P||T |} to refer to all the
possible combinations of roads and time windows (in which
a fleet owner might be interested or one of its heavy-duty
vehicles might be operating) captured by the entries of the
product set P × T . In fact, it can be said that the set W
is isomorph to the set P × T . Our goal is to develop a
secure and private communication framework for the fleet
owners to identify potential heavy-duty vehicles that can
form platoons. This is clearly possible if the fleet owners
exchange the time and the roads over which all their heavy-
duty vehicles operate; however, that would violate the
privacy of the customers and the fleet owners (possibly
jeopardizing their competitive advantages). Therefore, we
would like to create a communication platform so that the
fleet owners can only enquire about each other’s interests
and logistical constraints under strict privacy constraints.
In fact, we show that the enquiring fleet owner does not
leak any private information (i.e., the other fleet owners
cannot realize the road and the time window of interest
of the enquiring fleet owner). In addition, we show that
even with most sophisticated manoeuvres the enquiring
fleet owner can only extract information on the interests
of the other fleet owners about at most two pairs of
roads and time windows (which considering the sheer
number of roads and time windows is negligible). To do
so, we use the Paillier’s encryption method, which is a
semi-homomorphic encryption technique. The encryption
method is introduced in the following subsection.
2.1 Background Material
In this subsection, the Paillier’s encryption technique
is briefly introduced (Paillier, 1999). The method (or
rather its security) relies on the Decisional Composite
Residuosity Assumption, i.e., for given integers N ∈ Z
and x ∈ ZN2 , it is “hard” to decide whether there exists
y ∈ ZN2 such that x ≡ yN modN . Here, the notation
ZN denotes the set of integers modulo N for all N ∈
N. More information regarding the assumption can be
found in (Paillier, 1999; Yi et al., 2014a). The encryption
scheme is as follows. First the public and private keys are
generated. To do so, large prime numbers p and q are
selected randomly and independently of each other such
that gcd(pq, (1 − p)(1 − q)) = 1, where gcd(a, b) refers
to the greatest common divisor of a and b. The public
key (which is shared with all the parties and is used for
encryption) is N = pq. The private key (which is only
available to the entity that needs to decrypt the data) is
(λ, µ) with λ = lcm(p−1, q−1) and µ = λ−1 modN , where
lcm(a, b) is the least common multiple of a and b. The
ciphertext of a plain message t ∈ ZN can be constructed
using E(t; r) = (N + 1)trN modN2, where r is randomly
selected with uniform probability from Z∗N := {x ∈
ZN | gcd(x,N) = 1}. Finally, to decrypt any ciphertext
c ∈ ZN2 , we may use D(c) = L(cλ modN2)µmodN ,
where L(x) = (x− 1)/N . The correctness of the Paillier’s
encryption technique implies that D(E(t; r)) = t for all
r ∈ Z∗N and all t ∈ ZN (Paillier, 1999). The following
important property shows that the Paillier’s encryption
is a semi-homomorphic encryption scheme, i.e., algebraic
manipulation of the plain data is possible without the need
for decryption using appropriate computations over the
encrypted data.
Proposition 1. The following identities hold:
(1) For all r, r′ ∈ Z∗N and t, t′ ∈ ZN such that t+t′ ∈ ZN ,
E(t; r)E(t′; r′) modN2 = E(t+ t′; rr′);
(2) For all r ∈ Z∗N and t, t′ ∈ ZN such that tt′ ∈ ZN ,
E(t; r)t
′
modN2 = E(t′t; rt
′
).
Algorithm 1 Procedure SubmitQuery for the first fleet
owner.
1: procedure SubmitQuery(w)
2: # Computed by the first fleet owner
3: for i ∈ W do
4: if i = w then
5: xi ← E(1; ri)
6: else
7: xi ← E(0; ri)
8: end if
9: end for
10: return x
11: end procedure
Proof. The proof follows from simple algebraic manipu-
lations and can be found in (Paillier, 1999). 
Proposition 1 shows that summation and multiplication
can be performed on the encrypted data. This is used
subsequently for creating a secure and private method for
coordination between fleet owners for heavy-duty vehicle
platooning.
3. SECURE AND PRIVATE COMMUNICATION
FRAMEWORK
In this section, we restrict ourselves to two fleet owners. We
subsequently generalize the setup to develop a distributed
coordination mechanism. Let us assume that the first fleet
owner would like to know if the second fleet owner has any
heavy-duty vehicle that uses the path and the time of the
day associated with w ∈ W. However, it does not wish
to let the second fleet owner to know w perhaps due to
the competitive nature of the fleet owners or the privacy
constraints imposed by the end user. Therefore, the first
fleet owner construct an encrypted vector x ∈ Z|W| such
that the i-th element of x is given by
xi =
{
E(1; ri), i = w,
E(0; ri), otherwise.
Note that the presence of the random element ri ensures
that with a high probability cyphertexts associated with 0
are different 1 . Then the first fleet owner transmits x to the
second fleet owner. The second fleet owner computes the
set W ⊆ W as the set of all w′ ∈ W with which at least
one of its heavy-duty vehicles is associated. The second
fleet owner then computes
y =
( ∏
j∈W
x
vj
j modN
2
)
modN2,
where vj is randomly selected from the set {1, . . . , N − 1}
with a uniform probability. We summarize the procedures
of the first and the second fleet owner in Algorithms 1
and 2. We can prove the following useful result pointing
to the correctness of our proposed methodology.
Proposition 2. If the first and the second fleet owner,
respectively, use Algorithms 1 and 2, then D(y) 6= 0 if
any of the heavy-duty vehicles owned by the second fleet
1 In fact, for industry standards that assume both q and q are of the
order of 1024 bits, we have N = O(22048). Thus the probability of
selecting the same r twice even in a vector of millions of elements is
smaller than 10−1000, which is practically zero.
Algorithm 2 Procedure ReturnResponse for the first
fleet owner.
1: procedure SubmitQuery(x,W)
2: # Computed by the second fleet owner
3: y ← 1
4: for i ∈ W do
5: Select vi randomly from {1, . . . , N − 1}
6: y ← y(xvii modN2) modN2
7: end for
8: return y
9: end procedure
owner uses the path and time window associated with w
and D(y) = 0 otherwise.
Proof. The proof follows from the construction of the
vector x and the application of Proposition 1. 
To be able to assess the security and privacy of the
proposed method from the perspective of the first fleet
owner, we present the following definition. This notion is
derived from what is known in the encryption literature
as semantic security. To present this definition, we need
to define the notion of negligible functions. A function f :
N→ R≥0 is called negligible if, for any c ∈ N, there exists
nc ∈ N such that f(n) ≤ 1/nc for all n ≥ nc (Ostrovsky
and Skeith, 2007).
Definition 1. Let the second fleet owner propose w1, w2 ∈
W. The first fleet owner chooses at random w from
{w1, w2} with equal probability and sends x constructed
using Algorithm 1. The second fleet owner can based
on its knowledge of x guess w. This guess is denoted
by w′. The second fleet owner’s advantage 2 is given by
Adv(k) := |P{w = w′}−1/2|, where k denotes the security
parameter, e.g., min(p, q) in the Paillier’s technique. The
proposed strategy is defined to be secure and private if
Adv is negligible.
Definition 1, although long and cumbersome, says that the
proposed strategy is secure and private if, essentially, the
performance of the second fleet owner in guessing the first
fleet owner’s preference w is not better than a pure random
number generator.
Proposition 3. Under the Decisional Composite Residuos-
ity Assumption, Algorithm 1 is secure and private in the
sense of Definition 1.
Proof. The proof follows from the application of the
results of (Paillier, 1999). 
Unfortunately, the privacy and security guarantees are
weaker for the second fleet owner. This is because by defini-
tion if the first and the second fleet owner, respectively, use
Algorithms 1 and 2, the first fleet owner can successfully
determine if the second fleet owner is in possession of
any heavy-duty vehicles that operate on the path and in
the time window associated with w (therefore some pri-
vate information is leaked even in the best of situations).
However, one might be able to argue that the first fleet
owner can potentially extract more information by not
following Algorithm 1. This is in fact true (pointing to
2 The advantage refers to its superior performance to that of a “dart
throwing monkey.”
a deeper erosion of privacy). However, in what follows, we
prove that the amount of information the first fleet owner
can optimally extract is limited (with the bound being
extremely small). Assume that the first fleet owner does
not use Algorithm 1. Instead, it constructs the vector x
such that xi = E(x˜i; ri) for some integer x˜i ∈ ZN . We can
prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If, for all i, xi = E(x˜i; ri) for some integer
x˜i ∈ ZN , then
D(y) =
( ∑
w∈W
x˜ivizi
)
modN, (1)
where zi = 1 if any of the heavy-duty vehicles owned by
the second fleet owner uses the path and the time window
associated with i ∈ W and zi otherwise.
Proof. The proof follows from the construction of the
vector x, x˜i,∀i, and the application of Proposition 1. 
Following Lemma 1, the first fleet owner needs to solve
D(y) =
∑
w∈W x˜ivizi modN to find zi for all i. Note that
the first fleet owner can introduce the change of variable
ξi = vizi and instead solve the linear equation modulo
D(y) =
∑
w∈W x˜iξi modN . Evidently, zi = 1 if ξi 6= 0 and
zi = 0 otherwise. Let us form the set
Ξ :=
{
ξ ∈ Z|W|N
∣∣D(y) = ( ∑
w∈W
x˜iξi
)
modN
}
, (2)
which represents the set of all solutions of the linear
equation modulo D(y) =
∑
w∈W x˜iξi modN . We can
prove the following useful result.
Proposition 4. Let t = |{i | x˜i 6= 0}| > 1. Then |Ξ| ≥ (N −
1)t−1 if there exists i such that gcd(x˜i, N) = 1.
Proof. For i such that gcd(x˜i, N) = 1, there exists
x˜−1i modN . Thus we get
ξi =
(
D(y)−
∑
j 6=i
x˜−1i x˜jξj
)
modN.
Therefore, all (ξj)j 6=i are free variables, i.e., for any se-
lection of (ξj)j 6=i, there exists ξi that satisfies the linear
equation modulo D(y) =
∑
w∈W x˜iξi modN . This points
to that the number of solutions of the linear equation
modulo (which is equal to |Ξ|) is equal to the number of
all the possible choices of (ξj)j 6=i. 
This shows that even if only two x˜i are non-zero, the
number of possible solutions ofD(y) =
∑
w∈W x˜iξi modN ,
i.e., |Ξ|, is larger than N − 1. The situation worsens as
more x˜i become non-zero because t (the number of the
non-zero elements) appear as an exponent. Noting that
the encryption relies on N being extremely large 3 , the
first fleet owner needs to check a huge number of possible
solutions, which is numerically impractical.
Proposition 5. Let t = |{i | x˜i 6= 0}| > 2. Then |Ξ| ≥
2(N−1)t−2 if there does not exist i such that gcd(x˜i, N) =
1.
Proof. If there does not exist i such that gcd(x˜i, N) = 1,
we can construct two sets where in the first one x˜i is
divisible by q and in the second one x˜i is divisible by p
3 Routinely, p, q are selected as prime numbers with the length of
1024 bits pointing to that N = O(22048).
(note that x˜i cannot be divisible by both as otherwise it
will be larger than lcm(p, q) = pq = N). Let the sets be
denoted by J1 and J2, respectively. In this case, we can
write
D(y) = q
( ∑
j∈J1
ξj
(
x˜j
q
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
x˜′
j
)
+ p
( ∑
j∈J2
ξj
(
x˜j
p
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
x˜′
j
)
modN.
Noting that gcd(p, q) = 1 (since p and q are prime
numbers), this equation can be separated into
α =
∑
j∈J1
ξj x˜
′
j modN, (3a)
β =
∑
j∈J2
ξj x˜
′
j modN, (3b)
where α = D(y)α¯ and β = D(y)β¯ with α¯ and β¯ denoting
Be´zout coefficients, i.e., α¯q + β¯p = 1. There are only two
Be´zout coefficients that satisfy |α¯| < p and |β¯| < q (Vialar,
2015, Proposition 13, p. 60). The number of the solutions
of (3a) can be lower bounded with the same line of
reasoning as in Proposition 4 by (N − 1)|J1|−1. Similarly,
the number of the solutions of (3b) can be lower bounded
by (N − 1)|J2|−1. This concludes the proof. 
Proposition 5 shows that, by smart planning and sophis-
ticated manoeuvres, the first fleet owner can realize if the
second fleet owner has any heavy-duty vehicles on the
roads and the time windows associated with two entries
of W instead of one by following Algorithm 1. Assuming
that |W| is large, this might not matter in practice.
Remark 1. (Computational Complexity). Before moving
to more complex communication structures, the compu-
tational complexity of the proposed algorithms should be
discussed. Algorithm 1 involves |W| encryption operations.
Each encryption operation has a cost that is a (nonlinear)
function of N . Noting that the size of N is often a constant
set by standards of the industry, the cost of the encryption
is also constant (albeit a large one). Therefore, the compu-
tational complexity of Algorithm 1 isO(|W|). Algorithm 2,
on the other hand, involves |W| ≤ maxi Ii exponentia-
tions and multiplications. Therefore, the computational
complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(maxi Ii). Therefore, the
total computational complexity of Algorithms 1 and 2
is O(|W|) because, in practice, maxi Ii  |W|. Finally,
since the first fleet owner needs to submit O(maxi Ii)
questions or queries to solve the platooning coordination
problem, the computational complexity of the whole task
is O(|W|maxi Ii).
4. DISTRIBUTED COORDINATION
Now, we use the results of the previous section to develop
a distributed mechanism for the fleet owners to coordinate
their efforts. Let the undirected graph G with the vertex
set F (i.e., the vertices are the fleet owners) and the
edge set E ⊆ F ×F capture the communication structure
among the agents. A walk over G (not to be mistaken with
roads over which the heavy-duty vehicles travel on real
transportation network) is a sequence of (not necessarily
unique) vertices L = (v0, . . . , vk) such that (vi, vi+1) ∈ E
for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. A k-connected graph is a graph that
after removing any k vertices (and all the edges connected
Algorithm 3 Procedure DistResponse for the fleet
owners in the walk L responding to the query of the fleet
owner ` distributedly.
1: procedure DistResponse(x,L,(Wj)j∈L\{`})
2: # Computed by the fleet owners in L except i
3: for j = v1, . . . , vk−1 do
4: for i ∈ Wj do
5: Select ωi randomly in {1, . . . , bN/(|L|−2)c}
6: xi ← xωii modN2
7: end for
8: end for
9: y ← 1
10: for i ∈ Wvk do
11: Select ωi randomly in {1, . . . , bN/(|L| − 2)c}
12: y ← y(xωii modN2) modN2
13: end for
14: return y
15: end procedure
to those vertices) is still a connected graph. We make the
following standing assumption.
Assumption 1. G is 2-connected.
Assumption 1 states that even if one of the fleet owners
is removed, all the remaining ones can still communicate
with each other successfully. This allows us to develop an
algorithm for the fleet owners to collaboratively respond to
queries by avoiding communication with fleet owners that
have submitted the queries. Let us consider the case where
fleet owner ` ∈ F would like to find out if there exists any
other fleet owner such that one of its heavy-duty vehicles
operate over the path and the time window associated with
w ∈ W. Further, let there be a walk L = (v0, . . . , vk) over
G such that v0 = vk = ` (therefore the walk is a loop)
while vj 6= ` for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1. Existence of such
a walk is guaranteed by Assumption 1. Similar, to the
previous section, fleet owner i can follow Algorithm 1 to
construct the vector x, thus submitting an encrypted query
for coordination. After that all the other fleet owners in
the walk L can follow the procedure in Algorithm 3 to
respond to the query of fleet owner `. In this algorithm,
Wj ⊆ W denotes the set of all w ∈ W with which at
least one of its heavy-duty vehicles of fleet owner j ∈ F
is associated. The following proposition shows that if fleet
owner ` uses Algorithm 1 and all the fleet owners in L\{`}
use Algorithm 3, the provided response is correct.
Proposition 6. If fleet owner ` uses Algorithm 1 and all
the fleet owners in L\{`} use Algorithm 3, then D(y) 6= 0
if any of the heavy-duty vehicles owned by the fleet owner
in L \ {`} uses the path and time window associated with
w, and D(y) = 0 otherwise.
Proof. The proof follows from the application of Propo-
sition 1. 
Note that, if fleet owner ` is interested in figuring out the
possibility of forming a platoon with all the other fleet
owners (and not a select few), it should find a walk L that
spans all the vertices of the graph.
A similar result as in Proposition 3 can be proved for the
enquiring fleet owner in this case as well. Therefore, we
focus on the privacy guarantees of the other fleet owners
in L \ {`}. Now, we can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 2. If, for all i, xi = E(x˜i; ri) for some integer
x˜i ∈ ZN , then
D(y) =
( ∑
w∈W
x˜ivi
( ∑
j∈L\{`}
zji
))
modN, (4)
where zji = 1 if any of the heavy-duty vehicles owned by
fleet owner j ∈ L\{`} uses the path and the time window
associated with i ∈ W and zji = 0 otherwise.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1. 
Similarly, following Lemma 2, the enquiring fleet owner `
must solve the linear equation modulo
D(y) =
( ∑
w∈W
∑
j∈L\{`}
x˜iξ
j
i
)
modN,
where zji = 1 if ξ
j
i 6= 0 and zji = 0 otherwise. Let us
construct the set of all possibilities
Ξ :=
{
(ξji )j∈L\{`} ∈ Z|W|(|L|−2)N
∣∣
D(y) =
( ∑
w∈W
∑
j∈L\{`}
x˜iξ
j
i
)
modN
}
. (5)
We can prove the following useful result regarding the size
of the set Ξ.
Proposition 7. The following two statements hold:
• Let t = |{i | x˜i 6= 0}| > 1. Then |Ξ| ≥ (|L| − 2)(N −
1)t−1 if there exists i such that gcd(x˜i, N) = 1.
• Let t = |{i | x˜i 6= 0}| > 2. Then |Ξ| ≥ 2(|L| −
2)2(N − 1)t−2 if there does not exist i such that
gcd(x˜i, N) = 1.
Proof. The proof follows a similar line of reasoning as in
Propositions 4 and 5.
This proposition shows that the privacy guarantees of the
fleet owners of the walk is stronger than those in the case
of two agents as the responses of all the agents gets mixed.
Therefore, even if the fleet owner can extract the aggregate
answers to two questions, it would not know which one
of the fleet owners from the set L \ {`} has responded
positively. In practice, however, when the fleet owners
show up for forming a platoon the set of all possibilities
gets further narrowed down.
5. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, we review some practical aspects of the
developed framework. Specifically, we review the compu-
tation time and the communication burden associated with
executing the proposed algorithms.
Let us consider an example, where two fleet owners need to
coordinate their efforts for organizing heavy-duty vehicle
platoons. Assume that there are |P| = 10 roads and time
of the day is discretized into |T | = 24 one-hour win-
dows. Therefore, |W| = 240. The second fleet owner has
heavy-duty vehicles on roads and time windows associated
with w = 1, 6, 21, 50. Figure 1 illustrates the outcome
of Algorithms 1 and 2 for various queries submitted by
w
16 21 50
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Fig. 1. The outcome of Algorithms 1 and 2 for various w.
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Fig. 2. The computation time ( ) and the commu-
nication burden ( × ) associated with executing
Algorithms 1 and 2 versus the key length.
the first fleet owner with a key length of 128 bits. The
vertical axis of Figure 1 is equal to one if D(y) > 0 and
is equal to zero otherwise. Evidently, D(y) > 0 for only
w = 1, 6, 21, 50. Therefore, as expected, upon following the
proposed algorithms, the second fleet owner can correctly
respond to the query of the first fleet owner without even
knowing the content of the query. However, this secure
communication channel comes at a price. Figure 2 shows
the computation time and the communication burden as-
sociated with executing Algorithms 1 and 2 versus the key
length, measured in bits. The computation is done with
Python programming language on Windows 7 over a PC
with Intel(R) i7-4770 CPU at 3.40GHz and 16GB of RAM.
The computation time rapidly increases with increasing
the key length. The amount of data the fleet owners need to
communicate also increases with the key length. Note that
the security of the encryption is related to the key length.
In fact, the computational complexity of a brute-force at-
tack that requires the test of all the keys of a specific length
grows exponentially with the key length. Note that the
computational complexity grows polynomially with the
key length (the linear appearance is due to the logarithmic
scaling of both axes in Figure 2). In fact, upon fitting an
appropriate curve, we get that the computational time (in
sec) grows as O(k2.44) with k denoting the key length.
On the other hand, the computational burden is a linear
function of the key length (the slope of the line in Figure 2
is equal to one) as the size of the integers that needs to be
transmitted grows linearly with the key length.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A secure and private framework for communication be-
tween two fleet owners was proposed. This secure commu-
nication platform was generalized to create distributed co-
ordination mechanisms among fleet owners for heavy-duty
vehicle platooning. The future work will focus on devel-
oping a centralized coordination mechanism for reducing
the computational complexity or outsourcing burden to
cloud computing services as well as the application of the
framework to other services.
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